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 AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS 
STRIKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN FORMULAS 
AND WATER IN THE TARIFFS 
ENARPRI WORKING PAPER NO. 18/JUNE 2006 
MARTINA BROCKMEIER, MARIANNE KURZWEIL AND JANINE PELIKAN
* 
Abstract 
n the current round of negotiations by members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
member countries committed themselves to substantially improving market access and 
reducing export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support. The Doha Work 
Programme adopted by the WTO in 2004 defines the modalities for the negotiations, but there 
are still many open questions: What will be the magnitude of the tariff cuts? Which products 
will be defined as ‘sensitive’? In addition, the difference between bound and applied tariff rates 
could be a criterion for defining sensitive products. Does the ‘water in the tariffs’ – which some 
define as any gap between the applied rate and the actual rate of protection, where the actual 
rate is lower – lead to an implicit preferential treatment for developing countries? How will 
sectors with different gaps between applied and bound rates be affected? 
This paper seeks to discuss and answer these questions. It analyses the effects of market access 
taking applied and bound rates into account. An extended version of the Global Trade Analysis 
Project model is used to first project a base run including the Agenda 2000, EU enlargement, the 
Everything but Arms agreement and the EU’s Mid-Term Review along with the WTO 
negotiations. Here, a differentiation is made between two experiments, both of which implement 
a more rigorous version of the Harbinson 1½ proposal. The difference between the experiments 
shows the effects of water in the tariffs, which are summarised in the conclusions. 
 
 
                                                 
* Martina Brockmeier, Marianne Kurzweil and Janine Pelikan are with the Institute of Market Analysis 
and Agricultural Trade Policy (FAL), Bundesallee 50, 38116 Braunschweig, Germany (e-mail: 
martina.brockmeier@fal.de). This paper was prepared for the IATRC Summer Meeting held at the 
European Commission Joint Research Center, Seville, 19-21 June 2005, Comments are most welcome, 
but please do not quote the results without contacting the authors (martina.brockmeier@fal.de). 
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1. Introduction 
The WTO initiated a new round of trade negotiations on agriculture and services in 2000. 
According to the Doha mandate adopted on 14 November 2001, the WTO members committed 
themselves to substantially improving market access, reducing with the view towards phasing 
out all forms of export subsidies and to substantially reducing trade-distorting domestic support 
(WTO, 2001). Furthermore, it was decided that non-trade concerns and special and differential 
treatment for developing countries should be an integral part of the negotiations. After this 
agreement on the Doha mandate, a tenacious negotiation process started to reach a consensus on 
modalities for further negotiations. In July 2004 the WTO General Council finally adopted the 
Doha Work Programme or so-called ‘Oshima text’, which defines the modalities for further 
negotiations (WTO, 2004).  
Although it seemed as if the disputing parties had reached an agreement, the outcome of this 
agreement is still highly uncertain. In contrast to the former proposals (e.g. the Harbinson 
proposal) the content of this recently adopted agreement is very vague. It was decided to use a 
tiered formula for tariff cuts, with deeper cuts for higher tariffs. Beyond that, the proposal 
contains almost exclusively qualitative information about tariff cuts, the abolition of export 
subsidies, etc., but does not make any concrete statements regarding the time horizon or 
magnitude of protection cuts. Also, nothing was said about the concept that will be used to 
convert non-ad valorem tariffs, e.g. specific tariffs to ad valorem equivalents (AVEs). Here, 
WTO negotiators recently decided on a complex concept that utilises unit value data from two 
different databases, namely the WTO’s Integrated Database (IDB) and the COMTRADE 
database of the United Nations (Agra Europe Weekly, 2005, A2).
1 
As a result of the mostly qualitative consistency of the Doha Work Programme, there are still 
many open questions: What will be the magnitude of the tariff cuts? Which products will be 
defined as ‘sensitive’?
2 In addition, the difference between bound and applied tariff rates could 
be a criterion for defining sensitive products. Does the ‘water in the tariffs’ lead to an implicit 
                                                 
1 The WTO’s IDB provides import unit-value data, while the COMTRADE database of the United 
Nations supplies world unit values. If the difference between both values is less than 40%, the IDB values 
are employed in the calculation. But if the difference is greater then 40%, AVEs are calculated on the 
basis of both data sources. AVEs differing by more than 20% will be adjusted using a ratio of 82.5% 
(COMTRADE price) and 17.5% (IDB price) for basic agricultural products. For processed products the 
ratio of 60% to 40% is used. The price calculation for sugar, however, remains to be negotiated (Agra 
Europe, 2005, A2).  
2 According to the Oshima text, WTO members are allowed to “designate an appropriate number, to be 
negotiated, of tariff lines to be treated as sensitive” (WTO, 2004, p. A/6). It is most likely that countries 
select products with high tariffs and high trade and production volumes as sensitive (Jean, 2004, p. 9). 2 | BROCKMEIER, KURZWEIL & PELIKAN 
   
preferential treatment for developing countries? How will sectors with different gaps between 
applied and bound rates be affected? 
This paper seeks to discuss and answer these questions. Particularly, the paper analyses the 
impact of water in the tariffs in developed and developing countries. For this reason, section 2 
first discusses the role of water in the tariffs in WTO scenarios. In section 3 the methodological 
instrument, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), together with the theoretical extensions 
used for the calculations is introduced. Thereafter, model design and experiments are introduced 
in section 4, while results and conclusions are presented in sections 5 and 6. 
2.  Bound and applied tariffs in WTO scenarios 
Applied tariffs represent the duties faced by an exporting country. Depending on the trade status 
of the trading partners, the applied rates might be most-favoured nation (MFN) or preferential 
rates. In any case, applied rates determine trade flows. WTO tariff negotiations are, however, 
based on bound tariffs, which result from former WTO negotiations or from the WTO accession 
process. These are ceilings for applied tariffs and thus represent the maximum tariff that can be 
imposed on imports of a particular product. Although WTO negotiations focus on bound tariffs, 
the economic effects of tariff-cutting formulas clearly depend on changes in applied tariffs. For 
this reason it is necessary to consider both the applied and the bound tariffs available when 
WTO scenarios are implemented. 
The difference between bound and applied duties or effective protection is called ‘water in the 
tariffs’.
3 The effective protection is equal to the amount by which the internal market price 
exceeds the world market price before tariffs (Podbury & Roberts, 2003, p. 5). Figure 1 (1.1) 
shows a situation wherein the applied rate is assumed to be prohibitive, e.g. the applied rate lies 
above the effective protection.  
Figure 1. Bound rates, applied rates, effective protection and water in the tariffs* 
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* T = tariffs, br = bound rates, ar = applied rates, Peff = effective protection. To simplify matters, it is 
assumed that the effective protection is equal to the applied rate in Figures 1.2 and 1.3.  
                                                 
3 There is disagreement over the definition of the term ‘water in the tariffs’ in the literature. For example, 
Martin & Wang (2004) define water in the tariffs as any gap between the applied rate and the actual rate 
of protection, where the actual rate is lower (Martin & Wang, 2004). Additionally, the term water in the 
tariffs is not equivalent to the term ‘binding overhang’, which defines the difference between the bound 
and the MFN rate (Francois & Martin, 2003). AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS | 3 
 
Imports will therefore be unchanged, if the reduction of the bound rate is too low and results in 
a new bound rate that lies above the effective protection or above the applied rate (Figure 1 
(1.2)). There will be a trade effect, however, if tariff cuts exceed the water in the tariffs (Figure 
1 (1.3)). 
Water in the tariffs will lead to country-specific reduction commitments. Owing to the ceiling-
binding option, developing countries were allowed to implement the tariff binding without 
reference to former protection levels. As a result, the bound tariffs in developing countries are 
much higher than in developed countries (Anderson & Martin, 2005, pp. 14). Higher water in 
the tariffs in developing countries could result in smaller or zero reduction commitments for 
their applied tariffs. Therefore, developing countries could experience an implicit preferential 
treatment that might be added to the special and differential treatment already granted. The gap 
between applied and bound rates also varies among the sectors within a country, so that some 
sectors are discriminated against while others are favoured. Podbury & Roberts (2003) find that 
the gaps between applied and bound rates are not very high in the markets for butter, cheese or 
beef. Since protection levels in industrialised countries are very high for these sectors, tariff cuts 
will have a great effect while other sectors with higher water in the tariffs experience only small 
effects. Furthermore, the gap between bound and applied tariff rates gives countries the 
possibility to raise tariffs and thereby to protect their agricultural sectors from fluctuations on 
the world market. Varying applied tariffs under high bound tariffs can therefore contribute to 
greater instability on the world market (Gibson et al., 2001, p. 21).  
How can tariff cuts be calculated and implemented in partial or general equilibrium models? 
There are several alternative ways to do this. First, scenarios can be built at the most detailed 
tariff-line level. Here, applied and bound rates at the 8- or 6-digit tariff-line level are used to 
calculate the shocks necessary to implement the tariff cuts of the WTO negotiations (e.g. the 
tariff cuts of the Harbinson proposal). Thereafter, the shocks
4 are aggregated to the prevailing 
sector aggregation of the partial or general equilibrium model using import weights or other 
aggregation schemes. This procedure has the advantage of being as close as possible to the 
negotiation process, which in most cases indeed takes place at the 8- or 6- HS digit level. 
Additionally, it takes account of the tariff peaks that are most clearly identifiable at the detailed 
tariff-line level. An aggregation to a higher tariff level, e.g. the model’s sector aggregation level, 
typically smoothes out the tariff peaks that most likely result in lower tariff cuts.  
To build scenarios from the most detailed tariff-line level, however, requires a huge amount of 
resources in the form of access to the prevailing databases (e.g. TRAINS, COMTRADE, etc.) 
and in the form of human resources. Additionally, the work needs to be done for each WTO 
scenario, e.g. if tariff cuts for market access are based on the Swiss formula instead of the tiered 
formula suggested by the Harbinson proposal. Thus, a second, less resource-intensive 
alternative to implement WTO scenarios would be to first aggregate applied and bound rates 
from the 8- or 6- HS digit level to the partial or general equilibrium model’s sector aggregation 
using an appropriate aggregation scheme. With both applied and bound rates available at the 
model’s sector level, alternative WTO scenarios could easily be established. Do the results of 
these two approaches differ? The answer is clearly yes. But the most interesting question is the 
extent to which the results differ. To our knowledge, there is currently no publication available 
that tackles this problem. Yet several authors have established simulations that take bound and 
                                                 
4 There are several different ways to accomplish these shocks. Besides aggregating the shocks from the 8- 
or 6-digit level, it would also be possible to aggregate the new applied rate that results after the shock is 
implemented (
1
ar T  in Figure 1 (1.2 and 1.3)) from the 8- or 6-digit level to a model’s sector aggregation. 
An additional step would then involve the calculation of the shocks at the aggregation level of the model. 
The two procedures will deliver identical results providing the same aggregation scheme is utilised. 4 | BROCKMEIER, KURZWEIL & PELIKAN 
   
applied rates into account. Walkenhorst & Dihel (2003) implemented bound and applied tariffs 
for several agricultural sectors of OECD countries and selected non-OECD countries in Version 
5 of the GTAP database. Anderson et al. (2005) examine five Doha partial liberalisation 
scenarios with the World Bank’s Linkage model
5 and the underlying GTAP database (Version 
6.04). The database includes trade data from 2001 provided by MacMaps. For their analysis 
they add bound tariffs to the database and implement the tariff cuts at the 6-digit level. Also, 
Jean et al. (2005) analyse WTO tariff cuts according to a tiered formula on the 6-digit level by 
considering bound and applied tariffs. The analysis is also based on the GTAP 6 database. The 
same database (Version 6.05) is used by Anderson & Martin (2005) and by Hertel & Ivanic 
(2005). Both studies utilise bound and applied tariff rates and consider simulations with the 
GTAP-AGR model.
6 
3. GTAP  framework 
3.1  Standard GTAP model 
The analyses in this paper are based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, a 
comparative, static, standard multi-regional general equilibrium model. This model provides an 
elaborate representation of the economy including the linkages between the farming, 
agribusiness, industrial, and service sectors of the economy. The use of the non-homothetic 
constant difference of elasticity (CDE) functional form to handle private household preferences, 
the explicit treatment of international trade and transport margins and a global banking sector 
that links global savings and consumption are innovative in GTAP. Trade is represented by 
bilateral trade matrices based on the Armington assumption. Further features of the standard 
model are perfect competition in all markets as well as a profit- and utility-maximising 
behaviour of producers and consumers. All policy interventions are represented by price 
wedges. The framework of the standard GTAP model is well documented in the GTAP book 
(Hertel, 1997) and available on the Internet (www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/). 
3.2  Extensions of the standard GTAP model 
3.2.1  Policy instruments of the CAP and EU budget 
Agricultural policy instruments are represented through price wedges in the standard GTAP 
model. Therefore, the standard GTAP model is complemented with an explicit modelling of the 
instruments related to the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the EU. Following the approach of 
Frandsen, Gersfeld & Jensen (2002), we introduce an additional land subsidy rate into the 
model that is equalised across all sectors entitled to direct payments.
7 With the implementation 
of the MTR, the existing domestic support measures are converted into a region-specific, fully 
decoupled land-area payment, while budgetary outlays for total domestic support are held 
constant. We deliberately did not model the EU sugar policy, as this would require resources 
that go far beyond the scope of this paper (compare Brockmeier, Sommer & Thomsen, 2005). 
The EU budget is introduced in the GTAP model using an innovative Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM). This SAM not only covers the expenditures and revenues of existing agents (e.g. 
                                                 
5 The linkage model is a recursive dynamic and global, economy-wide model. For a detailed description 
see van der Mensbrugghe (2004). 
6 This model is an extended version of the standard GTAP model, which includes new econometric 
information. 
7 We are grateful to Hans Jensen for his support in implementing the decoupling. AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS | 5 
 
producers, government, private households, etc.), but also of the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). This EU budget receives 75% of the import duties for 
agricultural and non-agricultural products from producers, private households, the government 
and the capital account. Additional revenues result from an endogenously calculated GDP-
related tax that flows from the regional household level to the EU budget. Here, all EU member 
countries face an equal GDP tax rate. The revenues of the EU budget are used to cover 
agricultural output and export subsidies as well as direct payments. In contrast to these product-
specific instruments, expenditures for structural policies are not covered within the EU budget 
module. As a result of their characteristics and specific aims, structural funds cannot be 
allocated to certain commodities. This strongly hampers their implementation into a product-
specific model like GTAP. 
Obviously, the revenues of the EU budget from one member country are not identical with the 
expenditures of the EU budget for the same member country. A comparison of the revenues and 
expenditures of each member state therefore shows the net transfer that takes place within the 
EU financial system. Analogous to capital transfer, the net transfer within the EU is part of the 
current account balance, which makes up the difference between exports and imports of goods 
and services. Yet the sum of net transfers of all member countries equals zero, since the EU 
budget is balanced through the endogenous GDP tax rate.  
In the standard GTAP model, EAGGF revenues and expenditures are organised through the 
regional household. All components of the EU budget are therefore introduced with the help of 
dummy variables allowing an easy shift from the regional household level to the EU budget and 
vice versa. Consequently, a preliminary simulation is employed to move the GTAP database 
from the initial situation without the EU budget to a new equilibrium in which the EU budget is 
in charge of the EAGGF (Brockmeier, 2003, pp. 100-12). 
3.2.2 Projection  module 
In addition to changes in the political environment of an economy, macroeconomic 
developments such as technical progress are of great importance for the growth of an economy. 
In order to take these changes into account, corresponding trends are incorporated into the 
analysis at hand. For this purpose an approach by Walmsley et al. (2000) is used, which allows 
the inclusion of exogenous projections of the global and regional GDP and factor endowment 
into the extended GTAP model. In the simulations, technical progress is generated 
endogenously by the model, enabling the projected growth pattern. 
4. Simulations 
4.1 Database  and  aggregation 
The simulations are based on the GTAP database Version 6.04 with 2001 as the base year. The 
database consists of bilateral trade, transport and protection matrices that link 57 sectors in 87 
countries or regions. In order to keep the calculation effort within a reasonable scope, the 
database is aggregated into 14 regions and 16 sectors (see Tables A1 and A2, appendix). The 
regional sets are put together with regard to geographical nearness, developmental status or 
membership in a certain regional agreement. With regard to the sector aggregation, it was 
important to distinguish between primary and processed agricultural production sectors as well 
as between production commodities regulated through a quota and sensitive products. 6 | BROCKMEIER, KURZWEIL & PELIKAN 
   
4.2  Extending the GTAP database: Including bound tariffs 
The most recent GTAP database (Version 6.04) includes applied tariffs, which are based on 
MAcMap (Market Access Map). The source files of MAcMap come from the TRAINS, the 
WTO and the AMAD databases. The applied rates of the newest GTAP database version takes 
preferences, AVEs and tariff rate quotas (TRQs) into account. Information on preferences is 
taken from the TRAINS database and is augmented with data from national sources. AVEs are 
calculated on the basis of the median unit value of worldwide exporters using an average flow 
of the years 2000 to 2003. Finally, TRQs are taken into account utilising the filled rate from the 
AMAD database. If the filled rate is smaller than 90%, the in-quota tariff is used. The out-of-
quota rate is employed if the filled rate is higher than 100%. If the filled rate is higher than 90%, 
but smaller than 100%, a simple average of the in-quota and out-of-quota rate is applied (Bouët 
et al., 2004). 
Nevertheless, comparable bound rates at the 6-digit or at the GTAP database aggregation level 
are not yet publicly available. Accordingly, the GTAP database used for calculations in this 
paper is extended by bound tariff data. Tariff data up to a 10-digit level is provided by the 
Economic Research Service (ERS) of the USDA. They include agricultural ad valorem and non-
ad valorem bound tariffs from chapters 1-24 of the Harmonized System 1996 (HS96) with the 
exception of chapter 3, which includes fish and crustaceans. Specific tariffs, expressed for 
example in € per kilogram and compound tariffs consisting of a combination of ad valorem and 
non-ad valorem tariff rates are converted into AVEs. The calculation of AVEs is based on 
average world-import unit values (Gibson et al., 2001, p. 6ff.).  
Some bound tariff data are provided at the 8- or 10-digit levels. These tariff lines are aggregated 
to the 6-digit level using the simple average.
8 All 2-, 4- or 6-digit tariffs are aggregated to the 
GTAP level using import trade weights. This is done with the help of source generic world-
import values from the COMTRADE database of the year 2001. But intra-EU trade is excluded 
from the COMTRADE data.  
Import weighting is the most commonly used aggregation scheme, also utilised to aggregate the 
applied rates included in the GTAP database Version 6.04. Advantageously, trade weights take 
the relative importance of trade flows into account. Furthermore, the welfare implications are 
accurately addressed with this method. In contrast, the import-weighted aggregation scheme 
leads to an endogenous bias, as the weight for every individual tariff decreases with an increase 
of the tariff. Accordingly, prohibitive tariffs impeding market access and thereby reducing the 
trade volumes to zero are not taken into account by import weighting. Trade barriers are 
therefore underestimated with this method.
9 
4.3 Experiments 
Before the actual simulations are carried out, it is necessary to conduct some pre-simulations to 
implement the extended model structure and to update the protection rates (see Figure 2 and 
Box A1 in the appendix). This includes CAP instruments and the common budget of the EU. 
Based on the results of the pre-simulation, a base run is conducted that represents a projection of 
the exogenous variables population, GDP and factor endowment up to the year 2014. 
Additionally, the Agenda 2000 (2004), EU enlargement and the Everything but Arms (EBA) 
agreement (2010), as well as the MTR (2014), are implemented (for details see Box A1). The 
                                                 
8 This procedure was used because of missing data on bilateral trade values at the 8- or 10-digit levels. 
9 In contrast to this study, Walkenhorst & Dihel (2003) used simple averages for the tariff aggregation to 
avoid biases from the interdependence of tariff levels and trade flows. The simple unweighted average, 
however, does not take the relative importance of particular tariffs into account. AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS | 7 
 
base run only considers political intervention in the EU-15 and in the candidate countries. 
Developments in other regions, such as the US Farm Bill, are not taken into account. 
Figure 2. Base run and simulations 
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Parallel to the base run, a scenario is implemented as well. It takes account of the same 
projections and policy shocks (Agenda 2000, EU enlargement, the EBA agreement and the 
MTR), but in the time period from 2010 to 2014, it additionally includes simulations related to 
the WTO round. The ‘July package’ leaves a lot of room for speculation about how market 
access will be enabled through agricultural trade negotiations. Thus, in the following two 
experiments, a variation of the Harbinson 1½ proposal with reinforced reductions in each band 
is implemented (Table 1). 
Table 1. Tariff reduction in the simulations 
 Initial  tariff  rate 
(ad valorem) 
Average 
reduction rate 
> 90%  -75% 
≤ 90% and > 15%  -70%  Developed countries 
≤ 15%  -55% 
> 120%  -60% 
≤ 120% and > 60%  -50% 
≤ 60% and >20%  -40% 
Developing countries 
≤ 20%  -35% 
 
In experiments 1 and 2 all countries implement a cut of the import tariffs according to Table 1, 
while export subsidies are completely abolished. In experiment 1 (BD  &  APP), cuts are 
implemented taking bound rates into account. Thus, a cut of the applied import tariff is only 
introduced if the new bound rate is below the applied rate after the respective average reduction 
rate is implemented (see Figure 1 (1.3)). In experiment 2 (APP_ONLY), the cuts presented in 
Table 1 are carried out on applied rates. The difference between experiments 1 and 2 can be 
used to identify the impact of the water in the tariffs. Additionally, we introduce a cut of 50% 
(34%) for manufactures and services in developed (developing) countries. 8 | BROCKMEIER, KURZWEIL & PELIKAN 
   
5. Results 
This section discusses the results of the two experiments analysing the impact of the water in 
the tariffs. The results are presented in millions of US$ for the year 2001 of the GTAP database. 
The calculations are based on the software GEMPACK (Version 8.0), RunGTAP and 
AnalyseGE (Harrison & Pearson, 1996).  
In the following, we mainly focus on the trade balance. The appendices provide detailed results 
for the output of production and prices (Tables A4 to A5) on a disaggregated country level. 
Changes in the output of production are mainly induced by the changes in the trade regime. The 
output results show a pattern that is similar to the changes in the trade balance and are only 
discussed rudimentarily. 
5.1  Trade balance for the EU-27 
Table 2 reports the changes in the regional trade balance by commodity for experiments 1 and 2. 
The change in the trade balance represents the change in the value of fob exports minus the 
value of cif imports owing to the scenario considered in millions of US$. When summed across 
regions, this gives the change in the international trade margin supplied for each product.
10 In 
contrast, a summation across commodities will yield a trade balance of zero for the region. This 
is a result of the macro closure, which assumes that all changes in investments are financed by 
domestic savings. As a consequence, any changes in imports are constrained to be offset by an 
equal change in aggregated exports.  
Examination of the entries in Table 2 shows that the biggest changes in the EU-27 occur in the 
highly protected beef, milk, sugar and other food sectors. Other sectors, such as cereals, 
vegetables and fruit also experience a decrease in export values relative to imports, although 
these sectors are only moderately protected. By contrast, Table 2 reveals a slightly positive 
development of the EU trade balance for oilseeds, other animal and other meat. The second part 
of Table 2 presents the changes in the trade balance that result from experiment 2, which applies 
the same tariff cuts as in experiment 1, but does not take bound rates into account. A 
comparison between experiments 1 and 2 clearly discloses that the differences are not very 
pronounced for the EU. A significant divergence can only be observed for cereals, milk, and 
vegetables and fruit. Water in the tariffs does not seem to be of much importance for the 
commodities of the EU. 
Where does the negative development of the trade balance for highly protected EU food 
products come from? A more detailed analysis can be conducted based on the decomposition 
that splits the total change in its single components. These represent the so-called ‘subtotals’ 
that are attributable to changes in individual exogenous variables, e.g. the tariff cuts. Figure 3 
shows this decomposition for the changes in the EU’s trade balance of food products in 
experiment 1.  
                                                 
10 These margins are supplied by the other service sectors in each region, which therefore show a positive 
global trade balance equal to the value of margins on all international trade engendered by the experiment 
in question.  AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS | 9 
 
Table 2. Changes in the trade balance in experiments 1 and 2 (million US$) 
EU27 USA Japan Oceania IC WTO Brazil India Zimbab-
we
Bangla-
desh
Rest of 
ACP
Rest of 
LDC
WTO DC ROW
cereals -1426   -2575   81   -447   298   2246   -42   -4   0   -257   -61   2191   -305  
oilseeds 311   1610   109   -100   -397   -30   -6   -6   -1   -89   77   -1575   -34  
sugar beet & cane 26   7   1   0   1   0   0   0   0   -9   3   -56   1  
paddy rice 14   1277   -5830   320   8   -99   -28   0   -5   -62   -509   4136   -41  
vegetables & fruits -1262   -597   326   -310   211   -220   75   -8   -17   -70   -53   1969   -88  
cattle 396   -501   104   -139   213   -34   0   -1   0   -42   -2   78   -31  
other animal 187   -485   140   -72   223   -121   1   -2   -2   -30   -21   274   -90  
raw milk 90   -1   5   -4   14   -6   12   0   0   -13   -17   -13   -67  
beef -17423   2482   -2482   301   745   9201   1165   190   0   314   129   2833   2025  
other meat 1331   4711   -4983   -150   -1754   -1610   8   -6   1   -105   285   1609   212  
milk -11262   966   -624   3489   -1577   34   267   7   39   469   556   6587   1502  
sugar -2308   -727   -759   546   42   197   58   106   1   1747   -1613   2483   95  
other food -4806   269   -2282   731   -184   -446   -467   -14   -107   -326   -80   8438   -1000  
other primary 4706   2940   2086   -282   458   -794   -2787   38   -160   -319   -379   -6870   -1233  
manufactures 18698   -17581   13583   -3989   -1378   -7966   798   -301   365   -1695   1935   -15324   -1281  
services 12728   8203   528   105   3078   -353   945   3   -115   489   -251   -6760   335  
cereals -1135   -76   78   -333   647   1882   -11   -4   1   -178   23   -1218   -56  
oilseeds 369   1287   129   -97   -353   83   -62   -6   2   -71   86   -1478   -21  
sugar beet & cane 32   7   1   0   -18   0   0   0   0   -9   4   -53   1  
paddy rice 19   1143   -5886   301   7   -94   19   0   -4   -62   -532   4331   -50  
vegetables & fruits -775   -796   319   -128   348   -227   -999   -8   -15   -61   223   1698   -36  
cattle 444   -727   82   -206   292   -34   0   -1   0   -39   5   278   -31  
other animal 167   -522   136   -121   189   -126   23   -2   -2   -22   -34   410   -89  
raw milk 32   -5   5   -5   2   -6   92   0   0   -9   -21   -5   -81  
beef -17461   2846   -2335   861   659   9198   1344   192   0   255   121   1680   2038  
other meat 1511   5810   -4846   -97   -1583   -1417   44   -8   1   -341   263   -207   255  
milk -9751   1135   -1296   4152   -1821   6   126   4   44   288   546   5259   1583  
sugar -2324   -692   -748   568   74   308   31   103   -1   1810   -1644   2230   80  
other food -4671   1197   -4863   736   -223   80   -4688   -25   -119   -469   -125   11632   -286  
other primary 4667   1759   2314   -511   480   -818   -1914   47   -156   -255   -392   -6460   -1303  
manufactures 15510   -20646   15706   -4953   -1823   -8390   4616   -297   362   -1398   1711   -12277   -2406  
services 13366   8279   1204   -167   3124   -445   1379   6   -114   561   -235   -5821   401  
cereals -290   -2499   3   -114   -349   365   -31   0   -1   -79   -83   3409   -249  
oilseeds -58   323   -20   -2   -44   -114   56   1   -2   -18   -8   -98   -13  
sugar beet & cane -7   0   0   0   19   0   0   0   0   0   -1   -3   0  
paddy rice -5   134   56   19   1   -5   -47   0   -1   0   23   -195   9  
vegetables & fruits -487   199   6   -182   -137   8   1075   0   -2   -9   -275   271   -52  
cattle -47   226   21   67   -79   0   0   0   0   -4   -8   -200   1  
other animal 21   37   4   49   34   6   -22   0   0   -8   12   -136   -1  
raw milk 58   4   0   1   12   0   -80   0   0   -5   4   -8   14  
beef 38   -364   -147   -561   86   3   -179   -2   0   58   8   1153   -13  
other meat -179   -1099   -137   -52   -171   -194   -36   2   0   235   22   1817   -43  
milk -1511   -169   672   -663   245   27   141   3   -5   181   10   1327   -82  
sugar 15   -35   -12   -22   -32   -111   26   2   2   -62   31   253   15  
other food -135   -928   2581   -5   38   -526   4221   10   12   143   44   -3194   -713  
other primary 39   1181   -228   229   -22   24   -873   -9   -4   -64   14   -411   70  
manufactures 3188   3065   -2123   965   445   424   -3818   -4   3   -297   224   -3047   1125  
services -638   -76   -677   272   -46   92   -433   -3   -1   -72   -16   -939   -66  
Experiment 01
Experiment 02
Difference = Experiment 01 - Experiment 02
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The black bar on top of each section shows the total effect resulting from the implementation of 
the WTO negotiations on the trade balance of commodity i. The bars below represent parts of 
the total effect that are induced by the prevailing instrument, e.g. the first bar below the black 
one defines the negative effect for the EU trade balance resulting from the tariff reduction for 
food products exported from third countries to the EU. Thus, the first expression in brackets (i) 
indicates the commodity in question, the second one the source of the commodity, and the final 
one the destination of the commodity. 
Figure 3. Decomposition of the changes in the EU-27 trade balance for highly protected food 
products (billion US$) 
-18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2
other food
sugar
milk
beef
Total effect Tariffs (i, third countries, EU)
Tariffs (i, third countries, third countries) Tariffs (i, EU, third countries)
Tariffs of non-agricultural commodities Export subsidies (i, EU, third countries)
Rest  
Source: Own calculations. 
Figure 3 clearly reveals that the negative results for the trade balance of beef and sugar is driven 
by the tariff reductions of agricultural commodities coming from third countries into the EU. 
This is not surprising, as the EU’s protection level for beef and sugar is one of the highest 
protection levels worldwide. The tariff cuts for commodities exported from the EU to third 
countries accordingly only lead to small improvements of the trade balances for beef and sugar, 
while the elimination of export subsidies only induces comparatively small negative effects on 
the trade balances. In contrast, the trade balance of milk experiences a huge increase of imports 
relative to exports as a result of the elimination of export subsidies.  AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS | 11 
 
Also, the effect of the tariff reductions in third countries on the EU trade balance of milk stands 
out positively compared with the other food products. Responsible for this is the EU milk 
protection, which, among the worldwide milk protectionists, ranges at the lower end. Therefore, 
cuts of the EU tariffs have a lower importance compared with the elimination of export 
subsidies and the tariff cuts in third countries. This can also be seen from the second part of 
Table 2, where the loss of the EU trade balance for milk is reduced when tariff cuts are 
implemented on applied rates and are therefore higher. Figure 3 finally presents the 
decomposition of the trade balance for other food. Compared with the trade balance for beef, 
milk and sugar it is interesting to note that the negative effect owing to tariff cuts among third 
countries is comparably high. 
5.2  Trade balance for third countries 
Table 2 also presents the effects of the WTO negotiations on third countries. Unsurprisingly, 
Japan and the other WTO industrialised countries (WTO ICs) show clear negative 
developments of the trade balances for their prevailing protected sectors, e.g. paddy rice, other 
meat, milk and other food. In contrast, effects in the US are dominated by massive losses for 
cereals on the one hand and considerable gains for oilseeds, paddy rice, beef, milk and other 
meat on the other hand. Similarly, Oceania is able to realise enormous gains for beef, milk and 
paddy rice, while the region’s trade balance for cereals, oilseeds, and vegetables and fruit is 
deteriorating.  
Developing countries also show significant effects that are related to the implementation of the 
WTO negotiations. First and foremost, Brazil accomplishes high increases of exports relative to 
imports for cereals and beef, while these changes are only small for sugar. In contrast, the rest of 
the ACP countries and the other developing countries that are WTO members show a significant 
enhancement of their sugar trade balance. This improvement of the trade balance is also given in 
most of the other agricultural sectors of the other developing WTO-member countries. Quite the 
opposite is true for the rest of the least-developed countries (LDCs), which particularly lose in 
the sugar and the paddy rice sector due to the preference erosion. Finally, Table 2 also shows 
the effects of the WTO negotiations on Zimbabwe and Bangladesh. Here, it is important to note 
that Bangladesh gains in important agricultural sectors, particularly in the sugar and milk 
sectors, although as an LDC it does not implement any tariff cuts. Zimbabwe also experiences a 
gain in the trade balance of sugar, which, however, is accompanied by a significant 
improvement of the beef trade balance. 
The second part of Table 2 shows the effects of the WTO negotiations if tariff cuts are 
implemented on the applied rate. The difference between experiments 1 and 2 indicates where 
water in the tariffs has a sizeable effect (see Table 2, lower part). Water in the tariffs influences 
the outcome of the WTO negotiation in many sectors, but particularly in cereals, oilseeds, 
vegetables and fruit and all food products. Interestingly, in many cases it is possible to identify 
two countries or a subgroup of countries whose trade balance is increasing and decreasing, 
respectively, when tariff cuts are implemented at the applied rates, while other countries remain 
more or less unaffected. 
For example, Japan and India experience a strong decrease of their trade balances in experiment 
2, while the main gain accrues to other developing countries that are WTO members. Table 2 
also reveals that the US’s trade balance gains tremendously when tariff cuts are implemented on 
applied rates (experiment 2). In contrast, the developing WTO-member countries realise a 
severe deterioration of the trade balance for cereals. Similar results, although not so pronounced, 
can be observed for beef, other meat and milk products.  
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Figure 4. Decomposition of the trade balance for cereals in experiments 1 and 2 (billion US$) 
-3.5 -2.5 -1.5 -0.5 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5
WTO DC EXP01
WTO DC EXP02
USA EXP01
USA EXP02
Total effect Tariffs (i, IC, IC)
Tariffs (i, IC, DC) Tariffs (i, DC, DC)
Tariffs (i, DC, IC) Tariffs of non-agricultural commodities
Export subsidies (i, IC, DC) Rest
IC    Industrialized countries
DC   Developing countries
 
Source: Own calculations. 
These effects can arise from many different causes. As an example, Figure 4 decomposes the 
trade balance of the US and developing WTO-member countries for cereals into subtotals. Here, 
the decomposition is conducted by taking policy instruments in industrialised and developing 
countries into account. The trade balance of developing WTO-member countries for cereals 
shows an increase of $2.3 billion in experiment 1 (see Table 2). The upper part of Figure 4 
reveals that this result is driven by a trade-facilitating effect resulting from the tariff cut between 
developing countries. In experiment 2, the trade balance of developing WTO-member countries 
deteriorates by $-1.1 billion. Figure 4 clearly demonstrates that the main reason for this decrease 
is the cut in import tariffs for cereals exported from industrialised countries to developing 
countries.  
In contrast, the trade balance of the US for cereals shows a significant negative change of $-2.6 
billion in experiment 1 (see Table 2). The lower part of Figure 4 reveals that this result is mainly 
determined by trade-facilitating effects resulting from the tariff cuts between developing AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS | 13 
 
countries and between industrialised countries. The loss in the US trade balance for cereals is 
reduced remarkably in experiment 2 when tariff cuts are implemented considering only applied 
rates. Analogous to the effects for developing WTO-member countries, this effect is driven by 
the opening up of the developing countries’ markets for imports from industrialised countries. 
This variation of developing countries’ import tariffs applied on cereals coming from 
industrialised countries, however, has only an insignificant effect in experiment 1. Thus, from 
these experiments it can clearly be concluded that water in the tariffs matters for developing as 
well as for developed countries. In some cases, it can even reverse the sign of the results and 
therefore certainly needs to be taken into account when WTO scenarios are conducted. 
6. Conclusions 
The WTO negotiations of the Doha Round are a central issue in the public debate. This paper 
analyses the effects of market access taking applied and bound rates into account. An extended 
version of the GTAP model is used to first project a base run including the Agenda 2000, EU 
enlargement, the EBA agreement and the MTR. Additionally, the policy simulation run includes 
the WTO negotiations. Here, a differentiation is made between two experiments, which both 
implement a more rigorous version of the Harbinson 1½ proposal. While the first experiment 
takes bound and applied rates into account, the second only considers applied rates when the 
necessary shocks to implement the tariff cuts of the WTO negotiations are calculated. The 
difference between experiments 1 and 2 can be used to show the effect of water in the tariffs.  
The results and a comparison of the two experiments reveal the following points: 
  The biggest negative changes of the EU-27 trade balance occur, unsurprisingly, in the 
highly protected beef, milk, sugar and other food sectors, while the remaining sectors only 
experience moderate negative effects.  
  The differences of the EU-27 results are not very pronounced between experiments 1 and 2. 
Water in their own or third countries’ tariffs does not seem to be of high importance for the 
EU-27. A significant divergence can only be observed for cereals, vegetables and fruit as 
well as milk. 
  A decomposition of the negative change in the EU-27 trade balance for food products 
shows that the results for beef and sugar are driven by the tariff cut for imports coming from 
third countries. In contrast, the elimination of EU-27 export subsidies seems to be highly 
relevant for the milk sector, while the other food sector is most sensitive to the reduction of 
tariffs among third countries. 
  Japan and other industrialised WTO countries show clear negative developments for the 
trade balance of their prevailing highly protected sectors, e.g. paddy rice, other meat, milk 
and other food. In contrast, effects in the US are dominated by massive losses for cereals on 
the one hand and considerable gains for oilseeds, paddy rice, beef, milk and other meat on 
the other hand. Similarly, Oceania is able to realise enormous gains for beef, milk and 
paddy rice, while the region’s trade balance for cereals, oilseeds, and vegetables and fruit is 
deteriorating.  
  Brazil achieves high increases of exports relative to imports for cereals and beef, while 
these changes are only small for sugar. Conversely, the rest of the ACP countries and the 
other developing countries that are WTO members show a significant enhancement of their 
sugar trade balance. Zimbabwe also experiences a gain in the trade balance of sugar, which 
is further accompanied by a significant improvement of the beef trade balance. 14 | BROCKMEIER, KURZWEIL & PELIKAN 
   
  LDC countries lose particularly in the sugar and the paddy rice sectors owing to preference 
erosion, while Bangladesh gains in important agricultural sectors, especially in the sugar 
and milk sectors, although as an LDC it does not implement any tariff cuts.  
  Water in the tariffs influences the outcome of the WTO negotiations in many sectors, but 
most notably in all food products – particularly in cereals, oilseeds, vegetables and fruit. 
These effects are mainly observable in the US, Japan, India and other developing WTO-
member countries. 
  Interestingly, in many cases it is possible to identify two countries or a subgroup of 
countries whose trade balance is increasing and decreasing, respectively, when tariff cuts 
are implemented at the applied rates, while other countries remain more or less unaffected. 
Based on the experiments it can clearly be stated that water in the tariffs matters for developing, 
as well as developed, countries. In some cases, it can even reverse the sign of the results and 
therefore certainly needs to be taken into account when WTO scenarios are conducted. 
Additionally, it would be desirable to compare the results obtained in this study with results 
achieved when WTO scenarios are built from the most detailed tariff-line levels, e.g. from the 6- 
or 8-digit tariff-line levels. This comparison would give researchers some guidelines on where 
scarce resources can most efficiently be utilised in the tedious process of scenario-building. | 15 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Aggregation of countries and regions 
Countries and regions  Abbreviation  
1  European Union 15 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
EU-15 
2  Central and Eastern European countries 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus 
CEEC 
3  United States   usa 
4 Japan  jpn 
5 Oceania 
Australia, New Zealand   OCEA 
6  Other WTO members (industrialised countries) 
Canada, Switzerland, Rest of EFTA, Albania, Croatia  rWTOIC 
7 Brazil  bra 
8 India    ind 
9 Zimbabwe  zwe 
10 Bangladesh  bgd 
11  Other African – Caribbean – Pacific – Countries 
Rest of Oceania, Rest of FTAA, Rest of Caribbean, Botswana, South Africa  rACP 
12 Other  least-developed  countries 
Rest of Southeast Asia, Rest of South Asia, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Other 
Southern Africa, Madagascar, Uganda, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa 
rLDC 
13  Other WTO members (developed countries) 
China, Hong Kong, Korea, Rest of East Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Sri Lanka, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Rest of Andean Pact, Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay, Rest of South America, Central America, Turkey, Rest of Middle East, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Rest of North Africa, Rest of South African CU 
rWTODC 
14  Rest of the world 
Taiwan, Vietnam, Rest of North America, Rest of Europe, Russian Federation, Rest of FSU  ROW 
Table A2. Aggregation of sectors 
Sectors  Abbreviation 
1  Wheat, cereal grain nec  CERE 
2 Oil  seeds  osd 
3  Sugar cane, sugar beet  c_b 
4 Paddy  rice  pdr 
5  Vegetables, fruit, nuts  v_f 
6  Cattle, sheep, goats, horses  ctl 
7  Animal products nec  oap 
8 Raw  milk  rmk 
9 Meat:  cattle,  sheep,  goats, horses  cmt 
10 Meat  products  nec  omt 
11 Dairy  products  mil 
12 Sugar  sgr 
13  Food products nec, vegetables oils and fats, processed rice  OFOOD 
14 Other primary sectors 
Plant-based fibres, crops nec, wool, silk-worm, cocoons, forestry, fishing coal, oil, gas, 
minerals nec, wood products, petroleum, coal products 
OPRI 
15 Industry 
Beverages and tobacco products, textiles, wearing apparel, leather products, wood products, 
paper products, publishing, chemical, rubber, plastic prods, mineral products nec, ferrous 
metals, metals nec, metal products, motor vehicles and parts, transport equipment, electronic 
equipment, machinery and equipment, manufactures nec 
MNFCS 
16 Services 
Electricity, gas manufacture, distribution, water, construction, trade, transport nec, sea 
transport, air transport, communication, financial services nec, insurance, business services 
nec, recreation and other services, public admin./defence/health/education, dwellings 
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Table A3. Change in output (%) 
EU15 CEEC USA Japan Oceania IC WTO Brazil India Zimbab-
we
Bangla-
desh
Rest of 
ACP
Rest of 
LDC
WTO DC ROW
cereals -7.58 -4.78 -5.30 -68.73 -8.15 1.05 36.31 -0.06 -1.04 -2.44 -4.50 -0.44 -0.95 -0.06
oilseeds 2.10 2.13 7.37 21.27 -13.23 -10.65 -5.02 -0.13 -8.10 -1.54 -4.00 1.32 -14.76 -0.73
sugar beet & cane -23.61 -6.29 -3.03 -21.01 9.06 7.53 -1.56 0.49 57.03 1.91 31.95 -5.02 5.14 0.83
paddy rice -2.66 -10.23 48.62 -44.53 94.64 51.06 -7.09 -0.83 -8.97 -0.59 -1.29 -3.52 -24.48 -1.06
vegetables & fruits -3.44 1.08 -1.48 1.87 -2.95 4.06 -9.75 0.23 -4.89 -0.44 -1.49 0.08 1.54 -0.34
cattle -22.26 -9.54 2.54 -23.28 -0.35 1.18 40.81 0.75 29.96 0.55 2.51 0.15 3.42 2.78
other animal -1.44 1.70 1.94 -18.03 -3.42 -15.45 -2.28 0.58 -2.22 0.84 -0.58 1.46 1.89 1.56
raw milk -8.66 -6.02 1.22 -3.28 28.69 -12.58 0.00 0.88 15.81 0.56 6.99 3.45 8.21 1.38
beef -29.93 -50.61 4.02 -30.59 2.84 -4.25 64.96 74.04 178.54 23.39 3.62 4.61 6.17 38.95
other meat -1.39 7.85 5.94 -62.42 -3.86 -31.53 -23.52 9.78 -3.27 14.94 -5.19 6.09 3.34 5.39
milk -10.29 -28.61 1.49 -3.63 33.81 -18.57 0.16 4.52 43.71 24.52 16.24 72.57 23.97 20.39
sugar -34.71 -9.82 -3.27 -21.11 22.08 7.49 1.79 0.95 126.00 2.11 57.50 -13.62 8.32 2.48
other food -2.54 -1.59 0.20 -0.11 5.25 -1.00 -1.47 -1.82 0.66 -0.68 -1.70 -0.07 4.04 -1.14
other primary 0.86 2.19 0.47 1.34 -0.75 0.39 -3.19 -4.59 -1.39 -0.78 -0.62 -0.22 -0.54 -0.58
manufactures 0.49 2.49 -0.48 1.05 -3.63 -0.16 -5.12 -0.20 -7.97 0.68 -1.27 0.90 -0.50 -0.45
services 0.20 0.92 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.33 0.24 0.52 0.80 0.08 0.14 0.00 0.18 -0.01
cereals -6.87 -4.22 -0.35 -66.29 -7.15 3.16 30.74 -0.18 -1.25 -1.03 -2.99 0.29 -4.96 0.96
oilseeds 3.07 2.86 4.89 22.97 -14.09 -9.96 -3.57 -2.01 -8.72 -0.59 -3.65 1.47 -12.90 -0.07
sugar beet & cane -23.61 -6.32 -3.00 -21.32 9.23 -0.66 -0.62 0.44 55.42 1.79 33.07 -5.25 4.85 0.87
paddy rice -2.56 -9.66 41.60 -44.38 87.40 44.49 -5.61 -6.22 -8.96 -0.71 -2.67 -3.91 -23.83 -0.55
vegetables & fruits -2.65 0.98 -2.47 1.73 -1.99 5.59 -9.80 -2.56 -4.97 -0.54 -1.20 0.79 1.63 -0.17
cattle -22.19 -9.47 2.32 -22.67 1.23 1.28 41.23 -1.27 29.77 0.60 1.68 0.11 3.10 2.87
other animal -1.22 1.38 2.07 -17.07 -5.04 -15.15 -1.21 1.39 -2.67 0.90 -2.61 1.20 1.75 1.80
raw milk -8.03 -5.46 1.12 -6.28 33.43 -14.12 -0.15 2.07 7.57 0.63 4.50 3.26 6.98 1.43
beef -30.08 -50.62 4.39 -29.01 8.60 -5.50 64.99 86.97 180.37 23.16 3.12 4.32 4.26 39.24
other meat -1.01 6.34 7.02 -60.84 -2.80 -30.04 -21.34 116.60 -4.11 14.39 -15.28 5.70 1.46 5.68
milk -9.36 -25.39 1.50 -8.46 39.27 -20.50 -0.16 3.92 21.59 27.29 11.87 71.62 20.47 21.39
sugar -34.98 -9.89 -3.22 -21.41 22.71 10.86 3.91 0.14 123.64 1.96 59.75 -14.03 7.72 2.51
other food -2.43 -1.84 0.43 -1.80 5.28 -0.95 -0.17 -16.42 -0.33 -0.84 -2.70 -0.38 4.86 -0.06
other primary 0.86 2.10 0.21 1.36 -1.30 0.36 -3.22 -2.09 -1.05 -0.73 -0.44 -0.29 -0.44 -0.64
manufactures 0.39 2.34 -0.58 1.20 -4.56 -0.27 -5.37 1.38 -7.84 0.63 -1.05 0.72 -0.38 -0.72
services 0.21 0.93 0.05 0.19 0.10 0.34 0.24 0.76 0.85 0.10 0.14 0.02 0.18 0.01
Experiment 01
Experiment 02
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Table A4. Change in prices (%) 
EU15 CEEC USA Japan Oceania IC WTO Brazil India Zimbab-
we
Bangla-
desh
Rest of 
ACP
Rest of 
LDC
WTO DC ROW
cereals -7.6 -6.1 -1.7 -19.8 0.9 -4.6 19.4 -1.2 4.7 -0.7 1.0 -0.5 -1.4 0.3
oilseeds -1.1 -3.7 2.2 -9.6 -0.7 -6.4 8.5 -1.2 5.3 -0.2 1.6 -0.1 -6.4 0.2
sugar beet & cane -3.4 -6.3 -1.1 -12.5 5.7 -3.5 8.7 -0.8 13.8 1.1 15.0 -2.5 0.2 0.5
paddy rice -2.5 -2.9 17.3 -20.8 30.3 6.2 8.8 -1.6 4.7 -0.3 2.7 -2.2 -12.4 0.1
vegetables & fruits -1.5 -3.4 -0.5 -11.4 2.3 -4.6 7.7 -1.0 3.7 -0.2 2.2 -0.6 -0.9 0.4
cattle -2.9 -7.2 0.0 -17.5 2.5 -4.2 21.0 -1.4 9.9 0.1 3.4 -0.2 -1.2 0.6
other animal -1.9 -3.5 0.1 -8.1 2.0 -6.2 10.6 -0.9 4.4 0.2 1.9 -0.1 -2.3 0.5
raw milk -2.2 -4.7 -0.3 -11.6 7.0 -7.8 11.1 -0.7 7.4 0.1 5.8 1.0 -0.1 0.2
beef -1.8 -1.3 -0.2 -7.4 1.4 -5.0 11.2 -1.1 9.5 0.8 2.3 0.1 -0.3 0.6
other meat -1.0 -1.6 -0.2 -4.1 1.0 -6.8 9.4 -0.3 7.0 0.2 1.8 0.1 -1.2 0.4
milk -0.9 -1.6 -0.3 -3.3 3.4 -3.5 4.0 -0.8 3.6 0.6 2.9 1.6 0.2 0.3
sugar -2.0 -1.5 -0.8 -13.9 0.5 -1.0 3.4 -0.8 12.5 1.1 2.6 -0.7 -0.5 0.7
other food -0.8 -1.7 -0.3 -5.7 0.5 -1.9 2.1 -1.1 2.4 0.1 0.3 -0.7 -3.7 0.3
other primary -0.1 -0.6 -0.2 -0.9 -0.2 -0.3 1.3 -3.1 1.6 0.6 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.2
manufactures -0.2 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 -0.4 -0.5 0.0 -1.6 -0.1 1.1 -0.7 0.2 -0.2 -0.3
services -0.1 -0.5 -0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.4 -0.7 -0.1 1.6 -0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2
cereals -6.9 -5.6 2.0 -19.5 3.2 -2.9 18.0 -4.6 4.5 -0.3 0.6 0.1 -3.0 1.0
oilseeds -0.4 -2.9 3.9 -9.6 1.0 -5.3 8.8 -5.8 4.9 0.0 0.6 0.6 -6.3 0.9
sugar beet & cane -3.4 -6.0 1.4 -12.6 7.9 -4.3 8.9 -4.5 13.4 0.9 14.0 -2.2 -0.5 1.0
paddy rice -2.3 -2.7 18.6 -20.8 31.7 6.5 9.2 -8.3 4.6 -0.5 0.8 -1.8 -12.7 1.0
vegetables & fruits -1.3 -3.2 1.4 -11.5 4.5 -2.7 7.7 -6.0 3.5 -0.4 1.3 0.3 -1.4 1.2
cattle -2.8 -6.8 1.9 -17.3 4.6 -3.2 21.0 -4.9 9.7 -0.1 2.1 0.1 -1.9 1.1
other animal -1.8 -3.2 1.4 -8.1 3.3 -5.5 10.7 -4.4 4.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 -3.1 1.1
raw milk -2.1 -4.3 1.4 -11.8 9.4 -7.1 11.0 -3.9 5.8 -0.1 3.7 1.6 -1.0 0.6
beef -1.7 -1.3 0.6 -7.4 2.6 -4.6 11.3 -2.1 9.2 0.8 1.2 0.2 -0.8 0.8
other meat -0.9 -1.5 0.4 -4.1 1.8 -6.7 9.5 -10.6 6.7 0.1 0.7 0.4 -1.8 0.7
milk -0.9 -1.5 0.3 -4.0 4.7 -3.3 4.0 -3.3 2.9 0.5 1.7 1.9 -0.3 0.4
sugar -2.0 -1.5 -0.4 -13.9 1.0 -1.5 3.5 -3.6 12.1 1.0 2.1 -0.6 -1.1 0.9
other food -0.8 -1.6 -0.1 -5.8 1.0 -2.1 2.2 -4.0 2.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -4.2 0.6
other primary 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.9 -0.1 -0.2 1.3 -3.7 1.5 0.6 -0.6 0.1 -0.2 -0.2
manufactures -0.2 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 -0.5 0.1 -2.0 -0.2 1.0 -0.8 0.2 -0.2 -0.2
services -0.1 -0.5 -0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.5 -1.2 -0.2 1.6 -0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2
Experiment 01
Experiment 02
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Box A1. Pre-simulations, Agenda 2000 and EU enlargement 
Pre-simulations 
 CAP  instruments 
    complementarity approach for milk and sugar (assumption: quantity in the database 
represents production quotas) 
    land subsidy equalised across sectors to implement a homogeneous area payment 
  EU’s common budget  
    75% of tariff revenues as well as a share of GDP is accrued to the EU budget; 
determination of a uniform endogenous GDP rate 
    expenses of the EAGGF paid for by the common EU budget 
    net transfers among EU member states 
Agenda 2000 
 Cereals 
    reduction of intervention prices by –15% 
    unification of direct payments for cereals, oilseeds and protein plants 
    reduction of set-aside rate from 15% to 10% 
 Beef 
    reduction of intervention prices by –18% 
    no change in direct payments (assumption: increase in direct payments is compensated 
by a lower output) 
 Milk 
    reduction of intervention prices by –15% 
    retention of quota regulation 
    increase of quota by 2.4% 
EU enlargement 
  Creation of customs union 
    EU-15 and the middle and south-east European countries (MOEL) abolish all bilateral 
trade barriers 
    The MOEL establishes the trade protection of the EU-15  
    production quotas for milk and sugar are fixed at the current production level of the 
MOEL 
    no set-aside in the new member countries  
    direct payments in the EU-15 remain unchanged 
    100% of the current land and animal premiums in the EU-15 are transferred to the new 
member states (standard procedure) 
    fixation of ceilings for direct payments with endogenous adjustment of the premium 
rate for land and animals in the EU-15 
 Common  EU  budget 
    complete integration of the MOEL in the common budget of the EU: 90% of tariff 
revenues as well as a share of GDP to the EU budget 
    payments in the framework of the EAGGF in the MOEL through the common budget 
    implementation of net transfers between the EU-15 and the MOEL  
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